We consider how audit quality impacts sell side analysts' information environment.
Introduction
The aim of this paper is to extend our understanding of how audit quality impacts capital market participants, specifically sell-side analysts. Prior research generally finds that high-quality auditors are associated with improved quality and reliability of accounting information (Reichelt and Wang 2010; Dechow et al. 2010; Francis 2011) . There is also extensive evidence that capital market participants seem to differentiate and value audit quality.
1 One stream of research focuses on financial analysts (e.g., Abernathy et al. 2016 , Behn et al. 2008 , Wu and Wilson 2016 . Examination of how audit quality impacts on sell-side analysts is appealing, because as Bradshaw (2009) notes, analysts are typically assumed to be an important group of relatively informed financial statement users. Earnings forecasts are a primary output from these analysts, and it seems reasonable to assume that audited financial statements are a key input into analysts' forecasting process, especially in a setting such as we examine, namely analysts' forecast revisions immediately following firms' annual earnings announcements.
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Although Behn et al. (2008) show that higher audit quality (measured by Big N audit firms) is associated with increased accuracy and reduced dispersion in earnings forecasts issued by sell-side analysts, the exact means by which audit quality impacts on analysts' information environment is unclear. Moreover, some studies explicitly question whether financial analysts actually pay attention to audit quality. For example, Donovan et al. (2014) examine the transcripts of conference calls and find that analysts rarely mention and question the audit or auditors. Further, a recent survey of sell-side analysts (Brown et al. 2015) suggests that analysts rate an audit by a Big 4 auditor as a relatively less important signal of earnings quality. 3 Additional concerns also arise from the sensitivity of Behn et al.'s results to the way in which auditor quality is captured. In contrast to their results using a simple Big N distinction, they are unable to identify any association between the properties of analysts' forecasts and measures of industry specialization, which are commonly accepted as an indicator of audit quality (DeFond and Zhang 2014).
Our research addresses issues associated with both the basis on which audit quality indicators would influence sell-side analysts, as well as the appropriate point at which such effects would most likely be evident. In contrast to earlier studies examining the association between properties of analysts' forecasts (e.g., accuracy and dispersion) and audit quality (Behn et al. 2008; Payne 2008; Wu and Wilson 2016) , we directly examine the association between audit quality and properties of analysts' information environment. Specifically, we investigate whether widely used indicators of audit quality (i.e., BigN auditor status and auditor client-industry specialization) are associated with more precise common and/or private information being reflected in revisions of analysts' forecasts for year t+1 immediately following the release of earnings for year t. Our evidence therefore speaks to the question of "how" audit quality impacts on analysts' forecasts of earnings.
It is generally believed that analysts' information set contains both public (i.e., common) and idiosyncratic (i.e., private) components (Chen and Jiang 2006) . The common information set available to all analysts includes the contents of audited financial statements, and it is well documented that analysts use financial statement information to formulate and revise earnings forecasts (e.g., Abarbanell and Bushee 1997; Schipper 1991; Zhang 2008; Barron, Byard and Yu 2017) . There is extensive evidence that commonly used proxies for audit quality such as audit firm size and client industry specialization are associated with higher quality financial reports (Reichelt and Wang 2010; Dechow et al. 2010; Kanagaretnam et al. 2010; Jin et al. 2011; DeBoskey and Jiang 2012) ). Provided these attributes impact actual inputs to analysts' decision processes, we expect they will assign more weight to the financial statements audited by a high-quality auditor. Therefore, we expect a positive association between audit quality and the amount of common information reflected in analysts' earnings forecasts.
Furthermore, if high quality audits help to improve the quality of financial statements and this in turn is more informative of future earnings, then we expect a positive association between audit quality and the precision of analysts' common information.
As we have already noted, audit quality is associated with several attributes of financial reporting that are likely to result in less manipulated financial statements. For example, higher audit quality has been shown to be associated with lower absolute unexpected accruals (Becker et al. 1998) . Unexpected accruals are also far less predictive of future earnings than either the cash or expected accrual components (Xie 2001) . As audited financial statements are generally available to all analysts, then to the extent analysts rely on common information they should all benefit in developing their forecasts.
Finally, audit quality could also affect the precision of analysts' private information, although the direction of any predicted effect is unclear. On the one hand, public and private information may be substitutes (Verrecchia 1982; Kim and Verrecchia 1991) .
In this case, improved quality of public information resulting from higher audit quality may reduce analysts' incentive to acquire private information. On the other hand, if a subset of analysts has superior information processing skills, then higher quality common information may allow certain analysts to develop idiosyncratic insights that are not commonly shared Verrecchia 1994, 1997) , resulting in an improvement in the precision of analysts' private information. Although Byard and Shaw (2003) find that higher corporate disclosure quality is associated with increased precision in both the common and private information of analysts, the expected effect for audit quality is ultimately dependent on the means by which audit quality and private signals interact. While this is ultimately an empirical question, we expect that any change in the precision of analysts' private information will be less than the increase in the precision of common information, thereby resulting in an overall increase in the weight on common information.
Our empirical measures of the relative weights analysts place on common and private information, as well as their respective precisions, are taken from Barron et al. (1998, hereafter BKLS) . While these measures have been used to examine analysts' information environment in a number of settings (Barron et al. 1998 (Barron et al. , 2005 (Barron et al. , 2008 Byard and Shaw 2003; Botosan and Plumlee 2004; Mohanram and Sunder 2006; Byard et al. 2011; Han et al. 2013; Altschuler et al. 2015; Bradshaw et al. 2016; Barron, Byard and Yu 2017) , we are unaware of any examples where their association with commonly used indicators of audit quality has been considered. We use analysts' earnings forecast revisions following the release of annual earnings results to derive measures of consensus (i.e., the proportion of total information represented by common information) and the precision of analysts' common and private information. Applying the approach outlined by BKLS enables us to show how audit quality impacts on underlying characteristics of analysts' information set via reactions to the release of audited earnings (in this case, consensus and precision) rather than just examining the correlation with forecast attributes such as accuracy and dispersion.
Using multiple measures of auditor industry specialization as a proxy for higher audit quality, the results consistently support our prediction that analysts incorporate more common information into their forecasts for firms using higher quality auditors (i.e., audit quality impacts positively on consensus). Further, we find that both analysts' common and private information tend to be more precise when the firm's financial statements are audited by a high quality auditor. The results are also robust to several forms of sensitivity analysis, including attempts to control for endogenous auditor choice as well as an alternative method for estimating the precision of analysts' private and public information.
Our study makes two important contributions. First, we add to the literature that examines how audit quality affects decision making by users of financial statements and, by implication, the role of audit quality in capital markets. Other than documenting an association between audit quality indicators and forecast attributes such as accuracy and dispersion (Behn et al. 2008) , there is relatively little evidence explicitly linking audit quality to attributes of sell-side analysts' forecasts. An exception is Cahan et al. (2013) who provide evidence that analysts' forecasts are influenced by their perceptions of audit quality. However, their focus is specifically on the collapse of Arthur Andersen and its effect on forecasted earnings of their clients. 4, 5 Our results are more general,
showing that audit quality has a significant impact on the information environment of financial analysts, who are widely recognized as relatively sophisticated users of audited financial statements. In doing so, we also contribute to research on analysts' information processing by showing that analysts rationally use more common information and develop more precise private information when audit quality is high. 4 Another example is Abernethy et al. (2016) , who examine the relation between unexpected audit fees and analysts' forecasts. However, the manner in which unexpected audit fees reflects high versus low audit quality is unclear . 5 In a similar manner to Cahan et al. (2013) , Autore et al. (2009) (Yezegel 2015) , consistent with the effect of accounting (and audit) quality being most relevant at the time point when analysts likely place most weight on accounting information.
Our use of changes in the BKLS measures associated with analysts' forecast revisions surrounding the release of audited annual earnings figures is more likely to explicitly reflect the information effect of audit quality on sell-side analysts than prior research.
It also has the advantage of reducing endogeneity concerns in interpreting the results.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 briefly outlines the method suggested by BKLS for measuring the quality of common and idiosyncratic information available to analysts, as well as our hypotheses. In section 3 we describe our measures of audit quality, the sample selection and the method used to empirically estimate the measures suggested by BKLS (i.e., forecast revisions immediately after earnings releases). Section 4 reports our results, as well as several sensitivity tests and robustness analysis. Section 5 concludes.
Background and hypotheses

Measuring analysts' information environment
BKLS develop a model of analysts' forecasting process in which N analysts following a firm possess two signals about future earnings. One signal is public (i.e., it is common across all analysts) and the other is private (i.e., it is idiosyncratic). The common information is identical across all the analysts, while the private information is unique and is independently normally distributed with mean zero. Common information has precision h and private information has precision s. When formulating forecasts, analysts weight their common and private information by their respective precision (h or s).
BKLS define consensus (ρ) as the degree to which individual analysts' forecasts contain the same information. In other words, consensus is the ratio of common to total information in the analyst's forecast. This is also consistent with the consensus concept outlined by Holthausen and Verrecchia (1990) . The BKLS consensus measure enables inferences to be drawn about the extent to which analysts base their forecasts on public information relative to private information. Intuitively, the approach suggested by BKLS reflects the assumption that the dispersion of earnings forecasts among analysts' reflects the extent to which there is idiosyncratic information among analysts, and the information which is common among all analysts is measured by the squared error of the mean analysts' forecast.
Most importantly, BKLS show that their consensus measure can be directly inferred from the observable forecast dispersion, error in the mean forecast, and the number of forecasts. Hence, consensus can be expressed as follows:
where SE is the expected squared error in the mean forecast, D is the expected forecast dispersion, and N is the number of analysts.
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Under certain assumptions, BKLS also show that ρ can be interpreted as the average proportion of total information represented by common information in all analysts' forecasts (i.e., the degree of commonality in the average forecast). First, analysts' forecasts must be unbiased, on average. Biased forecasts would inflate the common error, resulting in an overstatement of the extent to which forecasts reflect common, as distinct from private information. However, our sample selection process (outlined below) addresses this issue to some extent by focusing exclusively on forecast revisions immediately after earnings releases.
The second important assumption made by BKLS is that actual earnings results do not reflect systematic earnings management aimed at meeting or beating the forecast (i.e., "benchmark beating"). We think this is a reasonable assumption for two reasons. First, prior evidence has failed to establish a link between apparent evidence of benchmark beating and firm-specific measures of earnings management such as unexpected accruals (Dechow et al. 2003) . Second, there are serious doubts about whether apparent discontinuities around benchmarks such as analyst' forecasts can even be interpreted as evidence of benchmark beating via earnings management Easton 2005, 2009 ).
BKLS further extend their analysis by invoking an assumption that analysts' idiosyncratic information is equally precise.
8 BKLS show that the precision of common information (h) and private information (s) can also be expressed directly in term of SE, D and N, in the following equations:
As BKLS note, their measures reflect unconditional expectations of forecast dispersion and error in the mean forecast (D and SE). Empirical implementation of this approach requires pooling of observations to measure dispersion and error in the mean forecast.
However, averaging of multiple observations has the advantage of reducing measurement error and therefore enhanced construct validity. Following prior studies Byard and Shaw 2003; Bradshaw et al. 2016; Barron et al. 2017 ),
we focus on analysts forecast revisions following earnings releases as our source of data for these variables.
Hypotheses
As we have noted, Behn et al. (2008) demonstrate that higher audit quality is associated with less dispersed and more accurate forecasts of earnings by sell-side analysts. If audit quality influences analysts' reliance on audited financial data, then we would expect to see a higher proportion of common information reflected in the mean forecast, as audited financial statements are public information and readily available to all analysts.
This would result in increased consensus as defined by BKLS (i.e., greater relative weight on common information).
The framework developed by BKLS also allows us to test the rationale behind an increased role for common information. This centers on the improved precision of the information. In the context of audit quality, we expect that financial statement data used as inputs to earnings forecasts will be more precise when it is audited by a high quality auditor. Hence, our first two hypotheses can be stated in alternative form as:
Higher audit quality is associated with increased consensus in analysts' mean earnings forecast
H2:
Higher audit quality is associated with increased precision of the common information component in analysts' earnings forecasts
We have acknowledged that the impact of higher audit quality on the private component of analysts' information is dependent, at least in part, on the extent to which private and common information act as substitutes or complements. While theoretical arguments are available to support either scenario, prior evidence that disclosure quality is related to the precision of analysts' private information (Byard and Shaw 2003) leads us to expect that audit quality may also be associated with an improvement in the precision of analysts' private information, but not to the same extent as occurs with common information. In other words, intuitively we expect the incremental impact of publicly observable audit quality on private information precision to be less than the effect on public information precision, thereby resulting in an increase in consensus.
Our third hypothesis can be stated in alternative form as:
Higher audit quality is associated with increased precision in the private information component in analysts' earnings forecasts.
Research method and sample selection
Measuring audit quality
Following prior studies, we identify instances of higher audit quality based on measures of BigN auditor status and auditor client-industry specialization. BigN auditors have been shown to be related to higher audit quality due to their incentives and competence (Watts and Zimmerman, 1981; DeFond et al., 2017) . Industry specialist auditors are more likely to provide higher quality audits, since they are better able to detect errors within their industry specialization than other accounting firms (Craswell et al. 1995) As with auditor size, there is considerable evidence of industry specialist auditors receiving economically significant fee premiums (Francis et al. 2005) , as well as being associated with higher quality financial reporting (Balsam et al. 2003; Krishnan 2003; Reichelt and Wang 2010; Kanagaretnam et al. 2010; Jin et al. 2011 ; DeBoskey and Jiang 2012).
Following Balsam et al. (2003) we use four proxies for auditor industry specialization.
The first two proxies are measures of the auditor's market share in an industry defined by two-digit SIC code, where market shares are computed based on client sales and the number of clients respectively. The next two proxies are dummy variables indicating the auditor with the largest market share in each two-digit SIC code industry (i.e., "market leader"), and again market shares are calculated in terms of client sales and the number of clients respectively. All of our tests rely on audit markets at the national level, and reflect client -based measures of industry specialization and leadership, rather than being restricted to the audit firm client portfolio (i.e., a specialist (or leader)
is based on the relevant client-firm industry, and not restricted to how a given audit firm's portfolio of clients is comprised). This approach is consistent with the evidence provided by Audousset-Coulier et al. (2016) , who provide an extensive set of validation test for a wide variety of measures used to capture audit firm specialization. They conclude (pg. 153) that measures based on large market shares at the client-industry level are "the most consistent and valid ones for measuring audit quality". 
Sample selection
Our main analyses are based on a sample of U.S firms. We rely on the IBES unadjusted detail database to obtain individual analysts' forecasts of annual earnings for year t+1 from 1985 to 2015 (Payne and Thomas 2003) . Our sample selection procedure closely follows Byard and Shaw (2003) . Specifically, we select forecasts issued during the 30-day period immediately after the announcement of earnings of year t. We further require that these forecasts are the updates of previous forecasts made during the 60-day window immediately before the earnings announcement. identify several reasons for using this approach. First, analysts who update their forecasts immediately after the earnings announcement are more likely to use their own information and less likely to "herd". Herding among analysts may cause underestimation of forecast dispersion and introduce measurement error. Second, these forecast revisions are conditioned on the same set of information, namely annual earnings announcements. This is particularly relevant to our study since we are interested in how audit quality, through annual financial statements, affects analysts' information environment. Third, this selection procedure controls for forecast recency and excludes stale forecasts that would likely inflate forecast dispersion. Once
Compustat data requirements are met, we have a sample of 25,111 firm-years (5,353 unique firms). Table 1 summarizes our step-by-step sample selection process.
Insert Table 1 here 9 We briefly consider possible alternative indicators of audit quality in our sensitivity analysis.
Research method
We use analysts' forecasts issued immediately after the annual earnings announcement to calculate realized forecast dispersion ( D ) and squared error in the mean forecast ( E Sˆ) as follows:
where Fi is forecast issued by an individual analyst i, F is the mean analyst forecast, A is the actual annual earnings (as stated by IBES), and N is the number of analysts.
We scale both realized dispersion ( D ) and squared error in the mean forecast ( E Sˆ) by the absolute value of actual annual earnings. To eliminate extreme values caused by the scaling variable, we delete observations with an absolute value of actual earnings of less than 10 cents per share. We then substitute D , E Sˆand N into equations 1, 2 and 3 to obtain the estimated analyst consensus, as well as the precision of analysts' common and private information.
To calculate meaningful forecast dispersions, we require that at least two analysts update their annual earnings forecasts for year t+1 within the 30-day period following the announcement of earnings of year t. Given that the BKLS model requires the precision of information (h and s) to be non-negative, we exclude estimates where h is negative (by definition, s cannot be negative). To test our hypotheses, we estimate the following ordinary least square regressions, using changes in ρ, h and s as the dependent variable (DV): DV = α + β1Audit + β2Surp + β3Size + β4MB + β5Analysts + ε
Following Bradshaw et al. (2016) and Barron et al. (2017) , we use changes in the BKLS measures as the dependent variables. Using changes of the measures also helps address endogeneity concerns. Unlike the levels of these measures that are likely to be correlated to audit quality due to firms' financial reporting choices, 10 changes in BKLS measures more likely reflect changes in analysts' information environment surrounding the annual earnings announcements.
Audit is our measure of audit quality at the end of year t. The hypothesis that higher audit quality results in larger improvements to analysts' information environment predicts β1 > 0, namely improved consensus and greater precision of public (and possibly) private information for clients of high quality auditors.
We include controls for previously identified determinants of the properties of analysts' information environment. Barron et al. (2008) find that large earnings surprises are followed by a decrease in analyst consensus but an increase in the precision of analysts' private information. This suggests that large earnings surprises motivate analysts to increase their private information search efforts, which in turn lead to their earnings forecasts reflecting a higher precision of private information. We measure earnings surprises by Surp, computed as the absolute value of the difference between the actual and mean forecasted earnings per share for year t, deflated by the absolute value of actual earnings per share of year t. Size is a common proxy for the level of a firm's information available to investors. Lys and Soo (1995) show that firm size is positively related to analysts' information precision. We measure firm size as market capitalization (in millions of dollars) at the end of year t. We also include the marketto-book ratio (MB) at the end of year t, to control for firm characteristics related to growth opportunities. Finally, we include the number of analysts (Analysts) at the end of year t, since Barron et al. (2008) show that more analysts updating their forecasts will incorporate more private information into the forecasts and thus reduce the consensus.
Our dataset is an unbalanced panel consisting of repeated observations from the same set of firms over time. One issue with panel data is that variables often demonstrate both cross-sectional and serial correlation, which could result in mis-specified test statistics. To avoid this problem, we adjust standard errors for clustering effects at both firm and year level (Petersen 2009; Gow et al. 2010 ).
Results
Descriptive statistics
Our final sample consists of 25,111 firm-year observations with non-missing values for calculating our measures of the properties of analysts' information environment, and for all of our explanatory variables. Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the sample.
On average, 94.3% of sample firms are audited by a BigN auditor, and about a quarter of sample firms are audited by an industry specialist auditor that has the largest market share in the relevant industry. The sample firms tend to have relatively large market capitalizations. This is not surprising given we require sample firms to be followed by we use rank regressions to perform multivariate analysis. Finally, since we define auditor industry specialization based on auditors' industry market share in a year, we rank all of our variables within each industry in the year, where an industry is defined by its two-digit SIC code.
Insert Table 2 here
Since we use ranked regression in the multivariate analysis, we report the correlation coefficients of ranked variables in Table 3 . Consistent with the BKLS model, we find that changes in consensus in analyst forecasts, Δρ, is positively related to the changes in the precision of analysts' common information Δh. Interestingly, Δh and Δs are positively related, suggesting that analysts' common and private information may be complementary to each other. More importantly, Δρ, Δh, Δs, and their changes are positively related to all five measures of audit quality. This lends some support to our hypotheses of higher audit quality being positively associated with both increased common information in analysts' forecasts, and higher precision of analysts' information.
Unsurprisingly, the five measures of audit quality are also positively associated with each other. Furthermore, Δρ, Δh, Δs are positively related to firm size, market-to-book ratio and the number of analysts following.
Insert Table 3 here
Regression results
In Table 4 we report results from ranked regressions using changes in ρ, h and s as dependent variables. Panel A shows models where the dependent variable (Δρ)
represents the change in the consensus (ρ) in analysts' forecasts from before to after the annual earnings announcement. We find that measures of audit quality are positively associated with changes in analyst consensus, suggesting that analysts give more weight to public information when forecasting earnings for firms with high audit quality. These results are consistent with the results reported by Behn et al. (2008) , that analysts' forecasts become less dispersed when audit quality is higher. BKLS show that analysts' forecast dispersion is smaller when the consensus among analysts is higher, or when the uncertainty about the firm's future is lower. Our evidence of increased consensus supports the argument that the smaller forecast dispersion reported by Behn et al. is most likely a reflection of increased use of common information as a result of higher audit quality. Table 4 presents the results from regressions using changes in the precision of analysts' common information (Δh) as the dependent variable. The coefficients of measures of audit quality are all positive and statistically significant. Taken together, the results in Panels A and B strongly support the prediction that high quality audit is positively associated with more accurate common information that analysts use to develop their earnings forecasts.
Panel B of
In our final set of tests (Table 4 Panel C), we examine the role of audit quality on the changes in the precision of analysts' private information (Δs). As we have noted, the expected effect of audit quality on the precision of analysts' private information is less clear, reflecting uncertainty about the relation between private and common information. However, consistent with the univariate evidence in Table 3, analysts' private information precision is positively associated with all the five measures of audit quality. For example, the coefficient for Share is 0.136 with a t-statistic of 11.24. These results suggest that high quality audits also help analysts improve the precision of their private information. This is also consistent with Byard and Shaw (2003) , who report that the precision of analysts' private information is increasing in the quality of public disclosures. A further inference is that analysts develop private information partly from processing public information.
Insert Table 4 here
Sensitivity analysis
The auditing literature has several possible proxy measures for audit quality in addition to the ones that we report in the main results in Tables 4 and 5 (DeFond and Zhang 2014). These alternative measures include audit fees and total fees, auditor tenure, and audit reporting lags. However, these measures typically reflect interaction between the client and the auditor, in contrast to our focus above on measures that reflect the structure of the market for audit services. Nevertheless, there is empirical evidence that higher audit fees, longer auditor (partner) tenure, and shorter audit reporting lags are associated with outcomes consistent with higher audit quality, such as the probability of restatement (e.g., Blankley et al., 2012 Blankley et al., , 2014 Carey and Simnett, 2006; Geiger and Raghunandan, 2002) . Hence, in sensitivity tests, we use each of these alternative measures of audit quality.
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The untabulated results show that audit fees and total fees are positively related to changes in ρ, h and s, suggesting that higher fees are likely to be related to higher audit quality and thus better information environment for financial analysts. Furthermore, auditor tenure is positively associated with BKLS measures of analysts' information environment, implying that longer audit tenure is conducive to higher audit quality and improved information for analysts. Surprisingly, we find a positive relation between audit reporting lags and ρ, h and s, implying a longer reporting lag is positively associated with an increase in common information in analysts' forecasts after controlling for earnings news and firm characteristics.
We conduct a number of additional tests to further establish the robustness of our results.
These address possible concerns about our sample selection process, the measurement of precision, the appropriate level of industry grouping, the identification of industry specialist auditors and the possible interaction between audit quality and the extent of earnings surprises. We briefly discuss each of these in turn.
Our sample selection requires that analysts update their pre-announcement forecasts within 30 days of the annual earnings announcements. In additional tests, we relax the requirement of a pre-announcement forecast, and use all the earnings forecasts issued in the 30-day window following the earnings announcement. Our results remain unchanged with this larger sample.
The method for estimation of the precision of analysts' common information (h) and private information (s) is based on the assumption that analysts' private information is equally precise. Gu (2004) relaxes this assumption and develops a model to estimate h and s without assuming that s is equal across analysts; where the average precision of analysts' private information can be estimated using observed analyst forecasts. We follow this approach and re-estimate h, and the average precision of private information, s. Our results remain unchanged.
We also consider the sensitivity of our results to our definition of client-industry used to identify specialist auditors. In the results reported in Tables 4 to 6 , we estimated ranked regressions having ranked the variables within industry, where industries are defined at the two-digit SIC code. For robustness purposes we also identify industries based on one-digit SIC codes, and then also use the Fama-French 48 industry classification. We find similar results using these two different industry classifications.
Finally, we examine whether our results are robust to including an interaction term between our audit quality proxies and the extent of the earnings surprise. In our tests reported in Tables 4 through 6 we assume audit quality is independent of forecast error, but it is possible that audit quality is directly associated with forecasting behavior (Ball et al. 2012 ) and therefore captures aspects of disclosure other than the quality of earnings releases. However, all of our results are robust to this extension.
Endogenous auditor quality
A possible alternative explanation for an association between analysts' information environment and audit quality is the endogenous selection of higher quality auditors (i.e., the possibility that client industry market share is associated with characteristics that also explain, at least in part, differences in analysts' precision). As an example consider client firm size. Recall that the BKLS consensus and precision measures are computed from unconditional estimates of the dispersion and error in mean forecasts (see section 2.1). Given that these are correlated with firm size, it is not surprising that the resulting BKLS measures of consensus and precision are also correlated positively with firm size. We also expect that firm size is associated with the demand for audit quality, and to some extent there is a mechanical relationship between client marketshare based measures of audit quality and client firm size (Minuti-Meza 2013).
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However, we utilize a research design which focuses on changes in analysts' information environment, rather than levels per se. Changes in the BKLS measures reflect the level of these measures prior to the earnings release, and the change induced by this announcement. While the pre-announcement level of these variables is potentially impacted by endogeneity, changes associated with the earnings release are not, and so at least in part serve to "control" for endogenous auditor selection.
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Nevertheless, we also endeavor to address endogeneity concerns in several ways. 14 First, we use a two-stage Heckman (1979) procedure, where our first stage regression models the selection of a high quality (i.e., client industry specialist/leader) auditor and the second stage includes the inverse Mills ratio (IMR) as an additional term in the regressions reported in Table 4 . Our first stage regression models the selection of a high quality auditor as a function of firm size, asset mix (property plant and equipment as a 12 Minutti-Meza (2013) uses three proxies for the accounting effects of higher audit quality (i.e., proxies for higher accounting quality). These are the absolute value of unexpected accruals, meeting or beating analysts' forecasts, and the propensity to issue a going concern audit opinion. Only the tests using unexpected accruals yield initial evidence of potentially spurious auditor specialization effects, and we note that these are tests of absolute (rather than signed) unexpected accruals. More generally, each of these proxies has been shown to lack power and/or be subject to significant biases in detecting earnings management, even when there is a clear incentive to engage in such behaviour (Dechow et al. 2010) . It is therefore unclear to what extent these problems offer an alternative explanation for the results. 13 We are grateful to the reviewer for suggesting this point. 14 Full details are available from the authors.
percentage of total assets, the sum of receivables and inventory as a percentage of total assets), leverage, profitability (an indicator for a reported loss and a measure of ROA) and the issuance of debt during the reporting period. Of these variables only firm size is controlled for in the second stage -the other variables are assumed to be at least largely exogenous of the analyst forecast properties that we model (Lennox et al. 2012 ).
When we include the estimated IMR as an additional variable we find that it is significant, but our inferences about the audit quality proxies do not change from those reported in Table 4 .
However, as noted by Lennox et al. (2012) , conclusions about the existence and direction of selection bias (and therefore, the extent to which results are robust to such biases) are entirely dependent on our choice of exclusion restrictions. One possible alternative is the use of propensity scores to create a "matched" sample, in the manner suggested by Lawrence et al. (2011) and Minutti-Meza (2013) . Propensity score matching (PSM) assumes selection occurs only on the variables used to identify the matched sample, and is premised on the assumption that an appropriate comparison is between (in this case) firms using an auditor identified as high quality and those which, in some respects "should" make such a choice but do not. More worryingly, show that the results in Lawrence et al. are very sensitive to research design choices, and suggest an alternative, namely coarsened exact matching (CEM).
At a general level, both PSM and CEM require matching on some firm characteristics, but we observe relatively little consensus on what those characteristics should be. We follow Minutti-Meza (2013) and choose two sets of characteristics for matching. The first set contains only firm size, and year and industry fixed effects. The second set includes firm size, property, plant and equipment, the sum of receivables and inventories, leverage, a loss dummy, return on assets and a dummy variable capturing debt issuance, as well as year and industry fixed effects. For PSM, we first estimate a probit model of auditor choice using firm characteristics, and obtain the propensity score which is basically the estimated probability of hiring an industry specialist auditor.
Then we find matched firms with the closest propensity scores. In CEM, firm characteristics are first grouped into "bins" based on the range of characteristics. Then firms are matched to those in the same bin. A choice for CEM is the number of such bins, and we use the STATA package and the autocuts option to select the number of bins.
After matching, we repeated the analysis in Table 4 . It is apparent that the PSM results are sensitive to the choice of treatment-to-control ratio and caliper size, while the CEM results are sensitive to the choice of matching characteristics. In some cases the results for industry specialist auditors reported in Table 4 are significantly weaker, but in others this is not the case. The absence of any discernible pattern in this extensive battery of PSM and CEM tests arguably lends support to the sentiments expressed by Lennox et al. (2012) regarding the limited ability of such techniques to adequately "control" for endogenous auditor choice.
As a final point, we highlight our use of a panel data design, which Lennox et al. (2012) suggests offers at least some control for potential endogeneity effects. The firm-specific fixed effects controls built into the regression results reported in Table 4 eliminate the potential bias caused by endogeneity so long as the source of the endogeneity is constant over time.
SOX effects
As a final way of addressing endogeneity concerns, we consider the adoption of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) as an exogenous shock to audit quality and its impact on analysts' information environment. Evidence of a strengthening association between properties of analysts' information environment and audit quality indicators post-SOX is consistent with higher audit quality being causally associated with those information environment changes, provided audit quality increased after the passage of SOX.
Passed in 2002, SOX created several restrictions on auditor-client relations such as banning the incumbent auditor from supplying many non-audit services to audit clients.
Proponents have argued that such regulation has the effect of improving audit quality via reduced threats to auditor independence, although extant evidence generally fails to find evidence in support of these claims (Ruddock et al. 2006) . SOX increased the litigation risk associated with financial reporting and thus created a stronger demand for high quality audits. In response, the average audit reporting lags has significantly The results from the difference-in-differences design are reported in Table 5 Table 4 that high quality audits have a positive impact on analysts' information environment.
Insert Table 5 here
Conclusions
Inferences about the effect of audit quality on users of financial reports are typically based on tests using stock prices, experimental research using a limited number of actual subjects, or surveys. An alternative approach is suggested by Behn et al. (2008) , who examine the impact of audit quality on certain attributes of sell-side analysts' earnings forecasts. However, although they demonstrate increased accuracy and reduced dispersion when the auditor is a Big N audit firm, their results do not extend to the widely used notion of client-industry specialization as an indicator of audit quality.
When viewed in conjunction with other research that fails to observe audit quality impacting on sell-side analysts (Donovan et al. 2014; Brown et al. 2015) , the channel by which audit quality impacts capital markets is less clear. We therefore use a setting where the focus is on reaction to information directly impacted by audit quality, namely forecast revisions in response to the release of annual audited earnings.
Our tests rely on well-accepted measures of analysts' information environment (BKLS), whereby analysts' information set is characterized as comprising common and private information. If audit quality impacts the inputs to analysts' earnings forecasting process, we would expect to see increased reliance on public information (i.e., including the audited financial statements) as well as increased precision of public information. Any increase in the precision of private information would not be expected to outweigh common information effects.
Using the BKLS method, we find that audit quality is positively associated with a measure of increased consensus in revised forecasts issued shortly after earnings releases. This indicates (by definition) increased weight placed on common, as distinct from private information. This is precisely what we would expect if widely observable indicators of audit quality actually impact on the use of information applied in the forecasting process. Consistent with the consensus results, we also find a significantly higher increase in the precision of common information for clients audited by high quality auditors. While higher audit quality is also positively associated with increased precision in analysts' private information, this effect is not sufficient to outweigh the effects on common information.
Our use of a changes specification reduces to some extent concerns that endogenous auditor selection explains our results. Our confidence in a causal interpretation is further enhanced by test using the passage of SOX as an exogenous shock, as well as results after applying standard econometric procedures used to address endogeneity effects.
Overall, our evidence provides a more complete explanation for the findings in Behn et al. (2008) , namely that analysts' earnings forecasts tend to be more accurate for firms with high audit quality. Our analysis shows that the improved forecast accuracy may result from the fact that high quality audit not only increases the precision of analysts' common information, but also allows analysts to develop more accurate private information. Overall, the results support the view that audit quality is a relevant consideration for sell-side analysts, and that this is one channel by which audit quality has implications for capital markets. Δρ (Δh, Δs) = α0 + α1Audit Quality + α2Surp + α3Size + α4MB + α5Analyst + ε where Audit Quality is measured by Share, Leader, Sharecl, Mostcl, respectively. The sample consists of 25,111 firm-year observations over the period from 1985 to 2015. Variables are defined in the Appendix, and transformed into their rankings each year within an industry defined by two-digit SIC codes. Standard errors are adjusted for both firm and year clusters. T-statistics are reported beneath the coefficients. ***, **, and * indicate that the coefficients are significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level. Δρ(Δh, Δs) = α0 + α1USA + α2PostSOX + α3USA × PostSOX + α4Surp + α5Size + α6MB + α7Analysts + ε using a sample for firm-year observations from U.S. and non-U.S. markets during the period from 1998 to 2007. Variables are defined in the Appendix. Except USA and PostSOX, variables are transformed into their rankings each year within an industry defined by two-digit SIC codes. Standard errors are adjusted for both firm and year clusters. T-statistics are reported beneath the coefficients. ***, **, and * indicate that the coefficients are significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
